I’m sure  that by now you have read all about the recovery of the flight recorders from the Air France A-330 crash in the Atlantic in June 2009.  There have been several articles about the information they are releasing from the data analyses.  Here is one from the Wall Street Journal that was published a couple of days ago. Here is one from today on the AvWeb site Most of the information from the latest AvWeb article comes from an update to the investigation published by the BEA (the French Aeronautic Agency doing the investigation). A pdf file of the BEA update is here and on the AvWeb site. If you read the BEA report and are not familiar with the terminology – PNF refers to ‘Pilot Not Flying’ and PF refers to ‘Pilot Flying’ – a way the cockpit duties are assigned once the aircraft starts the take-off. Captains and co-pilots (First Officers) often trade off duties on consecutive legs of a trip. This time it was the co-pilot’s turn to fly.

If you read the report and have any questions about terms or phrases – leave me a comment and I’ll try to clear up the terminology for you.

Once again – I wasn’t there (obviously), I have no first-hand knowledge of what went on in the cockpit nor do I have access to the actual flight recorder data or cockpit tapes. Even so, I thought I’d make a couple of comments.

In the ‘Final Minutes’ graphic in the Wall Street Journal the note mentions the nose being ‘pushed up’ which confuses me a bit. It was obviously not written by a pilot if they are implying that control inputs were the cause if the increased pitch.

The Airbus A-330 is an ‘electric jet’ -  meaning it is controlled by computers. The controls in the cockpit are not physically connected to anything directly controlling the flight control surfaces nor the engine. Everything is done through position and force sensors. The computers controlling the airplane read the forces and positions from the pilot’s movements of the control stick and power levers. The computers  analyze that information and then decide if the control movements that they imply are within the ‘laws’ programmed within their software. If the computers think the request is ‘legal’ they will move the control surfaces and/or change the power setting to match the request.

In the computer operating mode referred to as ‘Normal Law’ there are extensive safeguards enabled – such as the inability of the pilot to input control movements that will allow the aircraft to stall or overspeed.

Increasing systems failures may degrade the operating mode from ‘Normal Law’ to ‘Alternate Law’ to ‘Direct Law.’ As those systems degrade, so do the protections built into the flight control system that control inputs cannot override. In Alternate Law there are still some protections in place, but they act in a different way – and pilot inputs can override the protections. In Direct Law there are no computer-generated protections in effect. There is then a direct relationship between the cockpit control movements and the flight control surfaces – though still through the computers.

The only time that the aircraft is intentionally operating in  a mode close to Direct Law is during the landing flare (a condition called ‘Landing Mode’) – that is so that the pilot has some semblance of normal feel and control feedback during the landing.

While the plane is cruising along at FL350 it is in Normal Law with all the aerodynamic protections of the system in operation.  If the computers, for whatever reason, were to think that the airplane is  flying too fast – up near it’s maximum mach number at that altitude -  they would take actions to protect the airplane. Those actions could include a reduction in power and/or a pitch up to reduce the speed. If the computers thought the plane was flying too slowly it could increase the power to maximum and try to lower the nose.

With the system degraded to Alternate Law and the autopilot and autothrottles disconnected it is up to the pilot to keep the plane upright. Hand flying a plane in the traffic pattern and hand flying the plane at FL350 are vastly different exercises. Then add to that the lack of tactile feedback from the side stick and you multiply the difficulty. The side sticks physically move very little compared to ‘normal’ aircraft control sticks and they have a centering spring that tends to return it to the neutral position.

The Airbus does not take lightly one pilot trying to help the other one with the controls. There is a light and warning visible on the glareshield when both pilots are making control inputs. You can’t tell what kind of inputs the other pilot is using, only that they have used some force on the stick to move it from it’s center position.  The two pilot’s inputs to the controls are added together and the result is sent to the computers. If both pilots pull the stick half way back the computer assumes that you want full back stick. If one of the pilots pulls full back and the other pushes full forward the sum is zero and the controls don’t move.

Now there are calls being made to change the airline training system to include more hands-on experience. It isn’t just the training system that needs to be changed. There also needs to be a change the jet transport philosophy of flying. When autoflight systems became more reliable and accurate the emphasis changed from hand flying the airplane to managing the autopilot.

I can remember going through training in the first versions of the 747 as a copilot and spending the majority of my simulator sessions hand flying the plane while also handling the radio communications with Air Traffic Control. The captain and flight engineer would be handling the malfunction and checklists. There was no requirement to use the autopilot and as I remember it was implicitly discouraged.

By the time I moved to the left seat of the smaller Airbus A-320, then to the right seats of the more automated B-747-400 and then the Airbus A-330, the emphasis had shifted completely. You were required to use the automation to the fullest extent. My impression was that the automation was so complex and capable that philosophy was that the more you used it the more familiar and comfortable you would be with its operation. But that familiarity comes with a price – the deterioration of hand flying skills.

I’ve stated my feelings about relying on automation in previous posts about being a systems operator rather than a pilot. And it seems that I’m not alone in my feelings based upon this opinion piece from a 747 pilot.

Was the lack of hand flying skills a factor in the Air France accident?  Maybe the final report from BEA will say.

Added 6/1/2011

I didn’t see this particular episode of  ’The Early Show’ where ‘Sully’ Sullenberger was a guest, but this article on the CBS News site relates the opinions Captain Sullenberger expressed concerning the new information that has been released.

And here is an article from Jetwhine where Rob Mark gives his views on the newly released information.

In case you missed it, back in the first week in April an Airbus A-320 took off from New Orleans and then climbing through 4000′ the crew got a message on the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) concerning an Autothrottle system problem and then another saying that there was smoke detected in the Avionics Bay.

All sorts of things happened after that, ending in a landing back at the New Orleans airport with the nosewheel exiting the runway surface and the crew and passengers evacuating the aircraft using the emergency slides. No injuries were reported from anyone on board the flight, though I imagine New Orleans had a shortage of clean seat cushions the the rest of the day.

As more information came to light (The NTSB Preliminary Report is located here in pdf format) things started sounding a little ‘unusual’ to me. The report says that the crew lost primary instrumentation and on landing did not have anti-skid braking nor nosewheel steering. An Avweb article about the incident adds that it was the First Officers displays that went blank and also adds that the air-driven emergency generator deployed – that would refer to the RAT or Ram Air Turbine.

An interesting comment from the crew in both the Preliminary Report and the Avweb article is that neither member of the cockpit crew smelled or saw smoke during the incident – nor did any of the cabin crew.

First, let me say that I was not in the airplane, nor do I know the pilots, nor do I have any first-hand knowledge of what happened onboard the flight that day. All I have is what is published in the NTSB report , the Avweb article and my experience flying as an A-320 captain.

Second, let me reiterate that in-flight fires are nothing to mess with. All of our checklists say that if a fire is confirmed and cannot be immediately extinguished, you are to descend and divert immediately.

The A-320 Avionics Smoke detection system has an ionization detector (like you have in your house)  in an air circulation vent line. If the detector senses particles that it thinks are smoke it sets off the warning and generates the Avionics Smoke ECAM message.  There is no check for flames or heat associated with the detector.

Our procedures were to accomplish the checklist that appears on the ECAM screen and then go to the written Cockpit Operating Manual(COM) and see if further steps are required and to see what changes to our procedures will be necessary because of the steps we had taken.

As best as I can tell from the manuals that I have , the ECAM checklist on our aircraft started with “IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE…”

Our  COM checklist for Avionics Smoke started with :

If smoke is not perceived (sight or smell):
- Continue to search for signs of Avionics Smoke.
- End.

If smoke is perceived (sight or smell):
…

If you continue with the Avionics Smoke checklist you are to put on your oxygen masks and start a divert to the nearest suitable airport – then start trying to isolate whatever equipment is causing the problem. If you can identify the specific equipment you are to remove power from it. If the smoke is no longer perceptible after 5 minutes the procedure ends.

If the smoke is still perceptible after 5 minutes it is assumed that you have a real fire in the avionics bay (right below the cockpit) and the procedure gets really serious. You shut off the number one  generator (of two) and turn on the Emergency Electrical Power (extend the RAT).  Once you confirm that the emergency generator is operating you disable the APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) generator and turn off the number 2 generator – that leaves the RAT powering the aircraft electrical system. This emergency generator has a much smaller output than either the aircraft or APU – consequently several normally operating aircraft systems are disabled in order to make sure that essential equipment remains operational.

The result is that the First Officer loses all of his displays and all of the number 2 radios cease operation. The aircraft reverts to what is called Alternate Law, meaning that some of the computer-generated aerodynamic protections are lost. When the landing gear is extended this degrades even farther to Direct Law – you then have a manually-controlled airplane instead of a computer-controlled airplane. You also lose both autopilot systems, the autothrust system, one engine reverser, nosewheel steering and the antiskid function of the braking system.

As a recap, you have a hand-flown, single-pilot airplane. The First Officer has no displays nor access to any radios. With one thrust reverser inoperative and no antiskid system, there is a reduced ability to slow the aircraft on landing and once the rudder loses effectiveness only differential braking can steer the airplane. If the nosewheel is not centered the airplane will go wherever it is pointed as there is no nosewheel steering system.

So, what happened on this flight? I don’t know for sure, but according to the Avweb article, the NTSB is saying that there is no indication of any fire or smoke damage.

Anyway, I thought I’d throw this information out there and let you draw your own conclusions. Some day – maybe in 2-3 years – we’ll get the NTSB final report and see what they think happened.

You have probably heard that seniority is everything in the airline pilot business (or flight attendants, for that matter). An airline pilot’s date of hire with his company determines how he will live throughout his airline career. It’s probably one of the few professions where your ability to do your job has very little to do with your advancement.

You are given a seniority number based upon your date of hire and your age in relation to the other individuals in your new-hire class. The older you are the higher your seniority within the class.

Seniority begins to effect your progress immediately – the check rides during training will be scheduled by seniority unless there are circumstances that delay your training ( mx, sickness, etc.).

Once you finish training the seniority number really kicks in.  When position vacancies are announced they are filled by your recorded preferences – in company seniority order. Each month you bid for your monthly schedule – by your seniority in your airplane, seat and base. When you get your vacation days each year (and how many you get) is based on your seniority.

The seniority number you receive when you start training will be adjusted up a few times each year as pilots retire or otherwise leave the airline. The only time you will lose seniority is in a merger – depending upon the way that the merging of the two pilot groups is accomplished. Since seniority determines so much of a pilot’s life the merging of that list is a very big deal. There are lots of ill feeling lying just below the surface with the Delta and ex-Northwest pilots. I am aware of one set of brothers, one ex-Northwest the other hired at Delta 6-months after he started at Northwest. The Delta brother is now about 1000 numbers senior to the  ex-Northwest brother as a result of the way that the lists were merged. Yes, there are hard feelings there. I was competing for positions with pilots hired two years after me.

The only time that seniority takes a back seat is when a pilot seeks a position as something other than a line pilot. Positions such as simulator instructor or training management or a management pilot position such as chief pilot would be in this category. These positions often require personal interviews and a subjective evaluation by the interviewer of whether or not the individual will ‘fit in’ or follow the company line.

Seniority can be used to fly a lot or to not fly at all. If you are senior in your position you have the ability to bid virtually any trip that you want. If you live near your assigned base and don’t want to fly at all, you can bid a reserve schedule and sit at home on call. Some airlines allow senior pilots to ‘pass’ on a trip assignment as long as a more junior pilot is on call to take the trip. A commenter for a different article on this site mentioned a pilot he knew who did something like this – never flying a trip and maintaining landing currency by going to the simulator every 90 days.

Seniority certainly takes politics and favoritism out of the picture. Does it place the best pilots in the left seat? Not always. Oh, the pilots are all competent and qualified. Seniority won’t save you if you attempt to upgrade to a higher position and don’t possess the flying or management skills to run the aircraft and crew. Blood pressures go up and jobs are on the line when check rides are involved – especially the captain check.

Unless a merger is encountered you will be able to predict with almost certainty where you will be at any given point in your career. The marketing department (who really runs the airline) can screw up your plans by closing and opening pilot bases and moving aircraft bases around the country, but seniority is almost a constant.

I lived with the seniority system for 22 years and always felt that I was in control of my career until the past two years. Mergers do that to you.

One of my readers (Craig) posted a comment recently that contains questions or comments that could generate probably a half dozen articles. Thanks!

We’ve all heard of the changes to go into effect soon requiring a minimum of 1500 hours of experience before a pilot can fly as an airline pilot (captain or first officer). This is Congress’ knee-jerk reaction to the Colgan crash in 2009 – after all, they had to do something, right? (H.R. 5900: Airline safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010)

Experience is never a bad thing (unless it’s a bad experience). In order to be an airline captain you have always had to hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate. The minimum experience required to qualify for the ATP certificate is 1500 hours of flight time, so these Congressionally mandated rules are directed at the first officer position.

Is this going to make airline flying safer? I doubt it – at least not for several years. There are all sorts of arguments about ‘good’ hours versus time-filling hours and whether or not an extra 1000 hours in the local pattern flying a C-172 is going to make a difference. I personally would rather see the requirement be for a 500-hour crew-environment simulator course in a multi-engine turbine – but that’s just me. (I can hear the cheers from SimCom and Flight Safety.) Yeah, I know…who’s going to pay for it? My feeling is that at some point the airlines are going to have their own ab initio training programs.

When the flight experience portion of H.R. 5900 goes into effect in 2013 all airline pilots, whether they are captains or first officers, will have to possess an ATP certificate. That means that all of the current under-hour pilots already on airline seniority lists will have to obtain the extra hours and then pass the appropriate written and flight evaluations or their jobs will be in jeopardy. Looking at the way regional airlines work their crews it will probably take 2-3 years for a newly hired 300-hour commercial, instrument-rated pilot to meet the new requirements. If the projected increase in mainline flying materializes and when the  new crew rest rules go into effect (the same congressional mandate) there could be a lot of pressure on the regionals to find pilots as the majors siphon off the more experienced regional plots to meet their requirements.

Will this new flying hour rule effect the major airlines? Not unless the ‘perfect storm’ I just mentioned materializes. When you look at the requirements that the majors have for submitting an employment application you will see the need for a particular rating or hour requirement or possibly a college degree of some sort. The reality is that those minimums may qualify you for  an interview but until there is a bona fide  pilot shortage my guess is that it will probably take close to double the minimums to actually get an interview and then be offered a job. This is why you rarely hear the outcry of lack of flying experience when a major airline has an accident/incident.  But what about the new airline captain or first officer at the major airlines – they don’t have experience in the plane they’re flying. Very true. Their training programs take care of that problem.

Northwest Airlines was a very regimented, standardized airline. Their training programs taught you to perform pre-flights, instrument approaches and maneuvers is a set manner that would be duplicated every time. Both pilots knew what to expect from the other in virtually any circumstance. Standardization was drilled into you during the procedural and simulator phases of training. The flight training phase required a minimum of six flight legs be completed with an instructor in the other seat. A line check completed that phase of training. (If this was training for a first-time captain with the airline, the line check was accomplished by an FAA examiner.) Then all of this training was set into your memory with a requirement to obtain 100 hours of operating experience in the next 90 days. If that requirement was not met you were sent back to the simulator for another evaluation and the 100-hour requirement was started over from zero. There was an additional requirement that while you were in this 100-hour phase you could not fly with a pilot in the other seat who did not have at least 100 hours of experience. If you were a new captain you were required to make all of the take-offs and landings during that 100 hours.

Are similar training programs in place at other airlines? I don’t know. I’ve never flown for a regional and have never trained at another major airline (even after the merger of Northwest and Delta my training in the Airbus A-330 was conducted under the Northwest program using Northwest instructors).

Could that 2009 accident have been prevented – absolutely. Any number of links in the accident chain could have been removed. Would requiring the copilot to have 1500 hours of experience have made a difference? Maybe. Would more experience in the aircraft type have made a difference? Maybe. Would a better training program have made a difference? Maybe.  We can’t go back in time, make a change and see if the outcome is affected. Wouldn’t that be nice.

There has been quite a discussion going on over at AvWeb concerning the current series of reports being aired by ABC.  The FAA Administrator has even weighed in on the subject.

The Crash-Pad Experience

It has been a bit over 20 years since I started working for Northwest Airlines, but I can still remember those first few years. The pay during the initial training phase was abysmal even for a major airline – even below the first year pay rate. An ex-flight attendant was arranging lodging for trainees by contracting with apartment complexes to rent unfurnished 2-bedroom units and then renting furniture to put in the units. It was a pretty good deal and splitting the rent 4 ways made the costs bearable. After finishing training I moved into a large house owned by the same individual. There had to be 25 beds located throughout the place. There were almost a dozen people continually in residence since most of us were just out of training and sitting reserve (on call). I moved out of there after about 3 months – just after the police came around looking for the owner. Something about not paying a few bills.

My next ‘pad’ was in another apartment complex. It was a 2-bedroom unit shared with 4 other pilots. I bounced around several of these places for the first 2-3 years with the airline. I finally made it into a commuter pad in a complex across the street from the Mall of America. This place had been in operation since the complex had been built in the 1960s.  I stayed there as a member until the complex was torn down – a result of the north-south runway being built at KMSP.

We had four to six pilots in that unit – two bedrooms with two beds in each. It was rare that we had more pilots than beds for a night since all but one of us were holding a set schedule by then, but it did happen. The last guy to arrive got the living room sofa. I stayed  at this crash pad for about 15 years, even when I was senior enough to hold an international schedule with one trip a month. It was just more comfortable having a familiar place to go. When the light rail system went into operation with it’s terminals at the airport and the Mall you could ride it rather than getting a cab or incurring the costs with keeping a commuter car parked at the airport.

When the complex was torn down I started using a hotel room. I always commuted to my assigned base the day before a trip was to leave. I just didn’t want the added stress of trying to commute the same day as a trip started – especially when that first leg was 10-12 hours long.  Living on the west coast and flying out of the central time zone usually made that same-day commute impossible anyway.

The Situation Now

The first-year pay rate for a First Officer at one major airline is a bit over $56/hr no matter what airplane is being flown. The second year rate for a  mainline jet (DC-9/MD-88) raises that rate to about $76/hr. If the pilot is on reserve the guarantee is 70 hours of flight pay per month. (If you fly more hours you will get higher pay.)  Subtract from that amount all of our usual taxes and you get about 35-45,000 a year. Then subtract union dues, insurance premiums, education loans, flight school loans, car payments, etc., etc. The exposé that was run referred to regional airline pilots – who are paid a fraction of the pay rate of the major airlines. Do you still wonder why entry-level pilots are using crash pads and lounges to get some sleep?

Yes, there’s nothing that says you can’t move to where you are based and live there – if you can afford to move your belongings to the new location and set up a home. There are reasons why certain domiciles are junior (the pilot bases with the lowest seniority pilots). Those places either have too high a cost of living or they are in locations where you wouldn’t want to live unless you grew up there.

One of the few remaining perks of being an airline crew member is the ability to live where you want without much regard to where your flying is based. Commuting to work in another part of the country adds a day or two to each trip that you fly, but it gives needed stability to your family.

The media is in the business of selling papers and commercial time. They will sensationalize whatever they can if it will accomplish that goal. The use of crash pads and sleeping lounges to catch some needed rest is not going to change. There will still be five-flight days that start early and finish late. And the long work day will be followed by a 10-hour layover that starts when the aircraft door opens that night to off-load the passengers and stops when it closes for the next morning’s flight. There will still be pilots commuting across the country to go to work so that their families can live in a stable location that they an afford.

Pilot crash pads will always be part of the ‘airline pilot experience’. The only difference that you will find is the quality of the quarters. And that is directly related to the level of experience (read pay rate) of the pilots occupying them.